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ABSTRACT   
In the light of corporate scandals and the recent financial crisis, there has been an increased 
interest in the impact of business education on the value orientations of graduates. Yet our 
understanding of how students’ values change during their time at business school is limited. 
In this study we investigate the effects of variations in the normative orientations of 
economics programs. We argue that interaction among economics students constitutes a key 
mechanism of value socialization, the effects of which are likely to vary across more or less 
normatively homogeneous economics programs. In normatively homogeneous programs, 
students are particularly likely to adopt economics values as a result of peer interaction. We 
specifically explore changes in power, hedonism, and self-direction values in a two-year 
longitudinal study of economics students (N=197) in a normatively homogeneous and two 
normatively heterogeneous economics programs. As expected, for students in a normatively 
homogeneous economics program, interaction with peers was linked with an increase in 
power and hedonism values, and a decrease in self-direction values. Our findings highlight 
the interplay between program normative homogeneity and peer interaction as an important 
factor in value socialization during economics education and have important practical 
implications for business school leaders.  
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The recent global financial crisis and corporate accounting scandals (e.g., Enron, 
WorldCom, Parmalat) have triggered a decline in public confidence in the moral character of 
the leadership of economic institutions and have drawn attention to how economics education 
in business schools influences the values of students, and thus of future business leaders 
(Ghoshal, 2005). Management scholars have observed that business school education is 
becoming increasingly homogeneous, almost universally emphasizing the principles and 
values of economics, such as the maximization of self-interest (Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 
2005; Henisz, 2011). Consequently, they have become concerned with understanding the 
impact of the homogenization of economics education on student values (Starkey & Tempest, 
2009; Wright, 2010; Wang et al., 2011). Recognizing the unintended consequences of this 
homogenization, diversification of the curriculum has often been suggested as a way to 
minimize the impact of economics principles and to facilitate integrative reflection. Scholars 
highlight the importance of the inclusion of ethics-related classes in the curriculum (Evans et 
al., 2006; Rutherford et al., 2012), the integration of sociological and political science 
approaches towards the public good (Giacalone & Thompson, 2006), and the provision of 
institutional mechanisms that facilitate value awareness of students (Moosmayer, 2002). 
However, the arguments against the homogenization of economics education have been 
primarily theoretical, and little empirical research has investigated the effects of more or less 
diversified curricula on student value change. In this paper we address this gap and 
investigate value change in economics students at business schools that differ in the extent of 
their homogenization in accordance with the values of economics.   
Further, while to date a number of studies have examined the impact of economics 
education on student values, goals, and behaviors (Marwell & Ames, 1981; Carter & Irons, 
1991; Yezer, Goldfarb & Poppen, 1996; Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002; Gandal, Roccas, Sagiv, & 
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Wrzesniewsky, 2005; Frank & Schulze, 2000; Frey & Meier, 2005; Wang, Malhotra, & 
Murnighan, 2011), very little is known about the mechanisms through which this value 
socialization takes place. We focus on interaction with study peers as a key mechanism of the 
socialization of academic values in higher education (Parsons & Platt, 1973; Weidman, 1989; 
Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005). Since economics values emphasize instrumentally rational 
interaction between individuals (Ferraro et al., 2005; Ghoshal, 2005), interaction with study 
peers is likely to be a particularly important mechanism in the socialization of these values 
(Weber, 1978; Parsons, 1967). However, the impact of interactions between economics 
students on their value change has surprisingly not yet been investigated in prior research.  
 Importantly, we argue that interaction with study peers is only associated with value 
change when it occurs in normatively homogeneous economics programs (Weidman, 1989; 
Miller, 1996). This is because in normatively homogeneous economics programs students can 
experience particularly strong pressure to internalize economics values, as they are unlikely 
to encounter academic perspectives that contradict these values (Giacalone & Thompson, 
2006) and facilitate reflection on these values (Ghoshal, 2005; Ferraro et al., 2005). In 
normatively heterogeneous programs on the other hand, interaction with peers is unlikely to 
act as a mechanism for value change. Our findings suggest that policy makers in business 
schools may prevent the internalization of economics values by designing normatively 
heterogeneous academic programs that expose students to the assumptions of diverse 
theoretical perspectives and scientific fields of inquiry. 
Below, we first review previous research on the effects of economics education on 
value change. We then discuss peer interaction as a key mechanism for value transfer which 
can provide insights into why values are likely to change more strongly in normatively 
homogeneous economics programs. Finally, we discuss values that are particularly likely to 
be influenced by economics education.  
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ECONOMICS EDUCATION AND VALUE CHANGE 
Human values are enduring, trans-situational normative standards about the desirable 
that have properties of oughtness and that serve as guiding principles in human life 
(Kluckhohn, 1951; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). Values shape the replication of 
internalized patterns of action across various contexts (Meglino & Ravlin, 1998; Hitlin & 
Piliavin, 2004; Bourne & Jenkins, 2013). In university departments, values serve as 
generalized normative standards that shape the assumptions of scientific inquiry (Weber, 
1949; Blaug, 1992), and the development of academic vision, policies, curriculum, and 
teaching methods (Parsons & Platt, 1973; Smart, Feldman, & Ethington, 2000; Pascarella & 
Terenzini, 2005). Academic values enable university departments to integrate student 
activities around shared learning goals (Weidman, 1989; Moosmayer, 2012). Academic 
values are socialized during student involvement in curricular and social experiences in 
university departments (Weidman, 1989; Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005).   
Studies typically link student involvement in economics education with the 
socialization of self-interest oriented values and behaviors. Economics education has been 
linked to a higher concern with power (Kasser, Cohn, Kanner, & Ryan, 2007) and hedonism 
(Gandal et al., 2005). Research shows that economics majors exhibit a lower concern with 
self-actualization (Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002) and pro-social goals (Frank et al., 1993; Franks, 
Falk, & Hinton, 1973), and a higher concern with greed (Wang et al., 2011) and financial 
success (Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002). Other studies similarly find economics majors to be more 
concerned with profit and self-interest than non-economics majors (Marwell & Ames, 1981; 
Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Carter & Irons, 1991; Yezer et al., 1996; Frank & 
Schulze, 2000; Gandal et al., 2005; Frey & Meier, 2005; Rubinstein, 2006). Although a 
number of studies attribute socialization of self-interest oriented values to student self-
selection into economics education (e.g., Frank & Schulze, 2000; Gandal et al., 2005), 
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previous research also suggests that economics education alone may affect student values 
(e.g., Wang, Malhotra, Murnighan, 2011).   
Further, despite an increased concern with the normative impact of the 
homogenization of business school education in accordance with economics values (e.g., 
Ghoshal, 2005; Giacalone & Thompson, 2006; Henisz, 2011), little is known about the 
effects of variations in the normative orientations of economics programs. What little 
research there is has provided preliminary support for the idea that students are more likely to 
adopt economics values when they are exposed to normatively homogeneous education 
programs emphasizing these values. Specifically, Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993) found 
that Cornell University economics students who took a microeconomics class that was more 
homogeneously structured by economics values (i.e., more aligned with the principles of 
game theory and industrial organization) experienced a stronger increase in self-interest than 
students in a microeconomics class that was less structured by these values.
1
 While this study 
has focused on the effects of an individual class, it provides some preliminary support for the 
need for a more fine-grained understanding of student value change in economics programs 
that are homogeneously guided by economics values. 
We argue that our understanding of the effects of the normative orientation of 
economics programs can be enhanced by focusing on the mechanisms of value socialization 
during economics education. In the present paper, we explore the effect of interaction among 
economics students as a key mechanism of value socialization, the effects of which are likely 
vary across more or less normatively homogeneous economics programs.  
Impact of study peers on value socialization 
Values are primarily socialized during interpersonal interaction (Parsons, 1967; 
Weber, 1978; Rice, 2001; Bengtson & Black, 1973). In higher education, interaction with 
study peers is an important mechanism of the transmission and internalization of academic 
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values (Newcomb, 1966; Parsons & Platt, 1973; Lacy, 1978; Weidman, 1989; Pascarella & 
Terenzini, 2005). While interaction with study peers plays a critical role in students’ 
cognitive development (Pascarella, 1985), it is particularly important in the socialization of 
the values of academic major fields (Weidman, 1989). 
Study peers serve as a reference group for the evaluation, interpretation, and 
socialization of academic values (Clark & Trow, 1966; Kelley, 1952). They provide students 
with a frame of reference for the ordering of their values as well as a source of approval, 
performance, and social feedback (Girves & Wemmerus, 1988; Greller, 1980; Milem, 1998). 
Students compare their values with the value expectations of their peers who embrace the 
academic values to which they aspire (Newcomb, 1966). Through interactions with study 
peers students develop consensual and shared sets of expectations concerning the values of an 
academic discipline and the relevance of these values for their career (Antonio, 2004). 
Support for the notion that social interactions play a critical role in the adjustment to 
the values and norms of new contexts also comes from research on organizational newcomer 
socialization (Feldman, 1981; Morrison, 2002; Reichers, 1987). Reichers (1981: 278), for 
example, highlighted that social interactions constitute the “primary vehicle” of (initial) 
socialization in organizations. Social interactions provide information on the views and 
attitudes that are rewarded in a new context (Morrison, 1993), and allow newcomers to make 
sense of, and adjust to, organizational values (Reichers, 1981).  
Importantly, it is interaction with study peers rather than with faculty members that is 
particularly likely to contribute to student value change. Faculty members are often formally 
required to expose students to academic values. However, much of the socialization of 
academic values takes place during interpersonal experiences with study peers (Newcomb, 
1966). In their review of empirical research on higher education outcomes, Pascarella and 
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Terenzini (2005) conclude that interaction with study peers exerts a stronger influence on the 
internalization of academic values than exposure to the curriculum or to faculty members.    
Interaction with peers is likely to be particularly important in the socialization of 
economics values (Parsons, 1967; Weber, 1978). Economics emphasizes a concern with 
power, social comparison, and approval (Smith, 1759/2002; Srivastava, Locke, & Bortol, 
2001; Kasser et al 2007). Economics values are primarily adopted because they are approved 
of by peers and esteemed for their instrumental significance in relation to others (Kasser, 
2002). Individuals guided by economics values seek approval of others because it is 
instrumentally useful in maximizing their power in exchange relationships (Tonnies, 1996; 
Weber, 1978).  
The importance of peer interaction in the enforcement of economics values is further 
supported by research on self-interest by Miller and colleagues (Miller, 1999; Miller & 
Ratner, 1998; Ratner & Miller, 2001). Miller (1999: 1055) argues that economics values 
which place normative emphasis on the pursuit of self-interest are likely to be internalized 
when individuals are exposed to “repeated instruction […] on the power of self-interest”, 
which is then reinforced in social interactions. His research suggests that individuals are 
inclined to internalize economics values when they expect commitment to these values from 
others primarily for two reasons. First, individuals interacting with others whom they 
perceive as self-interested may worry about being taken advantage of (Miller, 1999). They 
therefore choose to act in a self-interested way themselves. This assumption has been widely 
supported by research on bargaining game experiments that suggest that the more individuals 
expect others to act in economically rational ways and pursue their own self-interest, the 
more they adopt economically rational strategies themselves (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; 
Bouas & Komorita, 1996; Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2003; Kay, Wheeler, Bargh, & Ross, 
2004; Molinsky, Grant & Margolis, 2012). Second, people pursue economics values 
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emphasizing self-interest in interaction with others who embrace these values because of a 
fear that doing otherwise would lead to “a waste of time and effort” (Miller, 1999: 1056). 
Individuals may be inclined to avoid economically irrational actions (e.g., contributing to a 
public cause or good) when such actions are not shared by others because of their belief that 
any such action of theirs is likely to be self-contained, unreciprocated, and ineffectual, and 
thus is likely to result in the waste of their efforts and time (Miller & Ratner, 1998). 
Therefore, people who interact with economically rational individuals can be disinclined to 
pursue actions that are incongruent with economics values. 
In summary, while there is little previous research on interaction with study peers in 
economics programs, there is strong theoretical support for the idea that it constitutes a key 
mechanism for the transfer of economics values. As we argue next, the impact of peer 
interaction will play out differently depending on how normatively homogenous an 
economics program is. 
Impact of study peers and program normative homogeneity  
The impact of study peers on value socialization is likely to vary across more or less 
normatively homogeneous economics programs. In particular, in an academic program that is 
homogeneously structured in accordance with economics values students are more likely to 
adjust their personal values to the normative demands and expectations of the academic 
environment during their interactions with peers (Weidman, 1989). This is because students’ 
thoughts and values are likely to be shaped by their perceptions of what others believe 
(Moscovici, 1980). In normatively homogeneous programs students are exposed to few 
normative alternatives as part of the curriculum, providing a limited set of perspectives to 
draw on in their interactions. They are less exposed to classes that are not embedded in 
econometric methods or the assumptions of homo economicus in general, and less exposed to 
students and teachers from other social sciences and humanities (Colander, 2001; Giacalone 
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& Thompson, 2006). Therefore, in homogenous programs economics students are less likely 
to encounter normative perspectives that challenge economics values (Bennis & O’Toole, 
2005; Starkey & Tempest, 2009; Wright, 2010).  
Consequently, in normatively homogenous economics programs students’ peers are 
likely to appear to be a relatively uniform group, providing students with a “biased sample of 
the social world” (Kitts, 2003: 225). Students are unlikely to recall instances where the values 
of economics have been challenged in social interactions and thus overestimate their 
prevalence (Marks & Miller, 1987; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973). This creates the impression of a “false consensus” regarding the “typical” values 
endorsed by students’ peers (Wang et al., 2011). Individuals who perceive high levels of 
consensus regarding a set of values are in turn more likely to conform to these values (Zou, 
Tam, Morris, Lee, Lau, & Chiu, 2009).  
In addition, in academic programs that are homogenized in accordance with 
economics values students may experience significant penalties for deviation from these 
values (Miller, 1999). In such programs students are likely to experience strong normative 
pressure to adopt economically rational strategies during their interactions because these 
programs are likely to place stronger emphasis on these strategies, and on student 
responsiveness to external demands (Weber, 1978; Riesman, Glazer, & Denny, 1970; White, 
1957).                           
In contrast, in economics programs that are normatively heterogeneous students are 
likely to be exposed to a more diverse set of normative perspectives and therefore more likely 
to develop awareness of the consequences of economics values for individuals and society 
(Giacalone & Thompson, 2006; Ghoshal, 2005; Ferraro et al., 2005). In addition to their 
interactions with peers, they will encounter alternative perspectives that challenge the values 
of economics. Interactions with peers will be characterized by a greater diversity of 
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normative views. A “false consensus” (Marks & Miller, 1987; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977) 
regarding the universal endorsement of economics values is less likely to emerge. In 
heterogeneous programs students are thus less likely to internalize economics values as a 
result of their interactions with study peers.   
Values affected by economics education: Power, hedonism, and self-direction        
We focus on three specific values which we argue are particularly likely to be affected 
by economics education. First, values of economics emphasize the maximization of power. 
Economics is underpinned by the values of the instrumentally rational action of the 
economically rational individual (homo economicus) (Mill, 1967; Hollis & Nell, 1975; 
Blaug, 1992). The efficiency of the instrumentally rational action that is guided by the 
utilization of the most efficient means to an end necessarily depends on individuals’ power to 
command means that are useful in the attainment of a given end (Weber, 1978). Individuals 
who act in an economically rational way in interactions with others seek to exercise power 
over them by using them as means to an end. For example, these individuals are likely to 
become involved in contractual relationships with those who are most useful and responsive 
to them. Further, for economically rational individuals the attainment of a given end, using 
the most efficient means, also serves as means towards further ends (Weber, 1978; Mill, 
1967). For example, they may use wealth accumulated in prior profit maximizing ventures to 
generate further wealth by investing it in new ventures. Research suggests that individuals 
guided by economically rational action seek power by maximizing wealth (Mill, 1967; 
Lewin, 1996; Kay, Wheeler, Bargh, & Ross, 2005; Wang et al., 2011) and reputation (Smith, 
1759/2002; Kasser, 2002; Liberman, Samuels & Ross, 2004) at the expense of egalitarian and 
expressive pursuits (Kasser et al., 2007; Molinsky, Grant & Margolis, 2012; Wang & 
Murnighan, 2011).  
VALUE CHANGE IN ECONOMICS EDUCATION  
12 
 
Second, economics also emphasizes the pursuit of hedonism.
2
 Economically rational 
individuals seek to derive hedonistic satisfaction from the utilization of the means that are 
instrumental in the attainment of a given end. Individuals who act in an economically rational 
way seek to derive satisfaction from using various ‘economic goods’, such as products, 
services, and people (Drakopoulos, 1991; Lewin, 1996). In human interactions, these 
individuals seek to derive satisfaction both from instrumentally using others and from being 
used by others (Weber, 1978). For example, in organizations these individuals may derive 
satisfaction from using their peers to increase their personal work performance or from 
maximizing their personal performance by being useful to their peers.         
Third, the internalization of economics values is also linked with a lower concern with 
self-direction. According to the neo-Weberian sociological research on the value implications 
of economic rationality, the internalization of these values entails the homogenization of 
individual idiosyncrasies, choices and goals in accordance with the economic rationality of 
using the most efficient means to an end (Weber, 1978; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Ritzer, 
2011). The homogenization of individuals’ actions in accordance with economic rationality 
decreases their concern with self-direction and spontaneity by making their actions more 
predictable and consistent. The more individuals act in an economically rational way the less 
they pursue idiosyncratic actions that are inconsistent with economic rationality. Individuals 
who act in an economically rational way prefer to emphasize their usefulness to others 
instead of emphasizing their independence from external demands (Riesman et al., 1970; 
Whyte, 1957).  
Moreover, psychological research based on self-determination theory suggests that the 
internalization of economics values, which emphasize extrinsically motivated involvement in 
an activity as means to an end, decreases individuals’ concern with self-direction by 
undermining their intrinsically motivated involvement in an activity as an end in and of itself 
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(Sheldon et al., 2004; Kasser et al., 2007). Since economically rational action is contingent on 
the availability of external rewards, such as, for example, pay or reputation, it undermines the 
intrinsically motivated involvement in an activity which is independent of external 
reinforcement (Deci, 1971; Deci & Ryan, 1987; Deci, Koestner & Ryan, 1999).           
Internalization of economics values thus entails an increased concern with power and 
hedonism at the expense of self-direction. These values are therefore particularly likely to be 
affected by economics education. Building on our theoretical arguments on the impact of 
study peers in normatively homogenous economics programs, we propose that economics 
students of homogeneous programs will experience a stronger increase in power and 
hedonism than their counterparts of heterogeneous programs when they interact with their 
study peers, and a stronger decrease in self-direction. Our hypotheses are:           
Hypothesis 1: Economics students in normatively homogeneous programs are likely 
to experience a stronger increase in power values than their counterparts from 
heterogeneous programs when they interact with their study peers. 
Hypothesis 2: Economics students in normatively homogeneous programs are likely 
to experience a stronger increase in hedonism values than their counterparts from 
heterogeneous programs when they interact with their study peers. 
Hypothesis 3: Economics students in normatively homogeneous programs are likely 
to experience a stronger decrease in self-direction values than their counterparts 
from heterogeneous programs when they interact with their study peers. 
METHOD    
Procedure and participants  
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a two-year longitudinal study of economics 
undergraduates from a business school with a homogeneous economics program, the Latvian 
branch of one of the leading European business schools, the Stockholm School of Economics 
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(SSER), and economics students from two leading Latvian university business schools with 
less homogeneous economics programs (University of Latvia and Riga Technical 
University).    
The Stockholm School of Economics in Riga (SSER) is a Swedish government 
sponsored business school in Latvia that was opened in 1994 with the goal of preparing 
economics and business professionals for the newly emerging market institutions in a post-
Soviet society. While economics students at the business schools of the two leading Latvian 
universities are exposed to a broader curriculum that, in addition to mainstream economics 
classes, also includes classes in humanities and social sciences (e.g., philosophy, history, 
political science, sociology, and psychology), at the SSER curricular alternatives are almost 
entirely limited to the major field. Moreover, SSER economics students interact primarily 
with the undergraduate population of the economics program. In contrast the academically 
heterogeneous administrative organization of Latvian universities is more likely to expose 
economics undergraduates to students from other academic disciplines. Therefore, economics 
students at the SSER are less likely to be exposed to ideas, theories, or methodologies that are 
incommensurable with the values of economic science.  
To establish that the business schools differed in the normative homogeneity of their 
economics programs, we conducted interviews with three senior academics from the SSER 
and four of their counterparts from the two Latvian universities on the curriculum and 
organization of the economics programs at their institution. We then recruited two expert 
judges with a PhD in economics and asked them to evaluate the differences in the normative 
homogenization of the economics programs of the SSER and the two Latvian universities 
based on a detailed description of program curriculum and organization, and the seven 
transcribed interviews with senior academics. Experts judged the reliability of the 
differentiation using six items derived from Colander’s (2001) conceptualization of the 
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variations in the normative homogenization of economics education, namely: (a) emphasis on 
technical econometric methods; (b) exposure to non-economics classes; (c) emphasis on 
saving and investment in foundational economics classes; (d) class administration layout; (e) 
exposure to non-economics students; and (f) teaching staff with academic degrees from the 
more normatively homogeneous economics programs. Judges rated how reliable the 
programs could be distinguished on each criterion, using a 10-point scale, ranging from 
“unreliable” (1) to “reliable” (10). The mean rating of six items was 7.25 (SD = 1.53), 
suggesting that raters felt they could reliably distinguish between the economics programs at 
the SSER and at the two Latvian universities. The obtained measure of inter-rater reliability 
(intra-class correlation coefficient = .85) indicated a high degree of agreement among expert 
judges that the economics program of the SSER is distinctively more homogeneously guided 
by the values of economics than the economics programs of the two Latvian universities. We 
were thus confident that the SSER can be classified as a normatively homogeneous 
economics program, while the economics programs of the two Latvian universities were 
normatively heterogeneous.   
We conducted two in-class surveys of economics undergraduates from the SSER and 
their counterparts from the two leading Latvian universities. Students were surveyed at the 
beginning of the first academic year (Time 1) and at the end of the second year of the 
economics program (Time 2). Exchange students from Western European societies, who 
were enrolled in economics programs of the SSER and Latvian universities for one semester 
or academic year (in total six students), were excluded from the survey. We surveyed 
students in-class rather than via e-mail or mail due to the probability of a higher response rate 
and quality of responses. Students from the SSER completed surveys in English, as the main 
language of instruction, and students from Latvian universities completed surveys in Latvian. 
To increase the proportion of participating students, we administered the survey during 
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lectures or seminars with the highest student attendance. The survey was completed in 
approximately 20 minutes.  
Longitudinal data were available for 77.3 per cent of respondents from the SSER (N = 
85) and 62.9 per cent of respondents from the Latvian universities (N = 112). The results of 
ANOVAs indicated that students from the normatively heterogeneous economics programs of 
the two Latvian universities, i.e., University of Latvia and Riga Technical University, did not 
differ in any of the values at Time 1 (power: F(1, 113) = .08, p = .78; hedonism: F(1, 104) = 
.09, p = .76; self-direction: F(1, 226) = .54, p = .46). We also tested for differences in the 
value change of students of the two Latvian universities. We used ANCOVAs to test the 
effect of the university (University of Latvia and Riga Technical University) on Time 2 
values, controlling for Time 1 values. Students of the two Latvian universities did not differ 
in their value change during the two year period of study (power: F(1, 103) = .14, p = .71; 
hedonism: F(1, 042) = .08, p = .78; self-direction: F(1,049) = .19, p = .66). This provides 
support for the argument that any differences in value change are due to differences in 
program normative heterogeneity rather than to differences in the institution students are 
enrolled in. Further, students of SSER and Latvian universities who responded at both time 
points did not differ from students who responded only at Time 1 in any of the values (power: 
F(1, 247) = .01, p = .93; hedonism: F(1, 247) = .66, p = .42; self-direction: F(1, 247) = .97, p 
= .33), suggesting that missingness at Time 2 was not related to the variables in our study. 70 
percent of students were female, and students were on average 18.9 years old (SD = 0.75). In 
our analyses below we focus on the longitudinal sample (N = 197).  
Methodology of research of academic socialization   
We examine student value change in accordance with the following theoretical model 
of academic value socialization (Astin, 1970; Tinto, 1987; Weidman, 1989; Pascarella & 
Terenzini, 2005; see Figure 1). The model differentiates interaction effects of program 
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homogeneity and peer interaction (effect e in Figure 1) from students’ self-selection into their 
academic and interpersonal experiences based on their pre-enrollment values (effects a1 and 
b1). By controlling for the effects of pre-enrollment characteristics, we can rule out that 
students who more strongly endorse economics values select a more homogeneous program, 
or that they interact more with their study peers.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
The model also differentiates the interaction effect between program homogeneity and 
peer interaction from the effects of students’ pre-enrollment characteristics, i.e., pre-
enrollment values, gender, age, ethnicity, parents’ occupational status, and family income 
(effect c); and from program enrollment characteristics, i.e., program normative homogeneity 
(effect a2), interaction with study peers (effect b2), interaction with teachers, residence during 
study, class attendance and involvement in paid work during study (effect b3), which have 
been highlighted as important confounds in theoretical models of academic socialization 
(Tinto, 1987; Weidman, 1989; Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005). Finally, because individuals are 
more likely to interact with others who they perceive to be similar to themselves (Newcomb, 
1966; Vreeland & Bidwell, 1965; Tinto, 1987), we account for the possibility that students in 
normatively homogeneous programs interact more with their peers (effect d).         
Measures  
Power, hedonism, and self-direction values were measured using the Schwartz Value 
Survey (SVS; Schwartz, 1992). The SVS has been extensively validated across a variety of 
cultural contexts, meaningfully differentiating between various professional groups, 
personality attributes, and behaviors (Schwartz, 1992; Verplanken & Holland, 2002; Bain, 
Kashima, & Haslam, 2006; Bardi et al., 2009). The motivational goals of power, hedonism, 
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and self-direction values are “social status and prestige, control or dominance over people 
and resources” (Schwartz, 1992: 9), “pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself” 
(Schwartz, 1992: 8), and “independent thought and action – choosing, creating, exploring”, 
respectively (Schwartz, 1992: 6). Economics students in the SSER completed the SVS in 
English and their counterparts in Latvian universities completed a Latvian version of the 
survey that was translated by Austers (2002). The Latvian SVS has been shown to exhibit 
good validity and reliability (Kalnina, 2004; Schwartz, 2006; Tart, 2011). Cross-national 
studies support the measurement equivalence of the Schwartz’s value measures across 
different languages and cultures (Schwartz, 1992; Spini, 2003; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004; 
Fontaine et al., 2008).                   
The SVS asks participants to rate the importance of 57 values “as a guiding principle 
in my life” on a nine-point scale. Scale anchors are: “of supreme importance" (7), 
“important” (3), “not important (0), and “opposed to my values” (-1). Value items are 
presented in two lists. Before rating each value item, participants identify the least and most 
important values. As specified by Schwartz (1992), we centered value scores on the mean 
importance attributed to all SVS value items.   
Scale reliabilities of power, hedonism, and self-direction value measures, comprised 
of 4, 3, and 5 items, respectively (Schwartz, 1992), were .67, .65, and .58 at Time 1, and .66, 
.72, and .66 at Time 2. Specifically, the reliabilities of power, hedonism, and self-direction 
values in the SSER sample were .69, .67, and .57 at Time 1, and .68, .72 and .65 at Time 2; in 
the Latvian university sample the reliabilities were .66, .64, and .59 at Time 1, and .64, .73, 
and .67 at Time 2. These scores indicate an acceptable, yet comparatively low level of scale 
reliability, which is often the case when a small number of items are used to assess a 
construct (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). Prior cross-cultural research has reported 
similar reliabilities for the measures of Schwartz’s value types (Verplanken & Holland, 2002; 
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Grouzet et al., 2005; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005; Bain, Kashima & Haslam, 2006; Bardi et al., 
2009).      
A confirmatory factor analysis using maximum likelihood estimation method in 
MPlus 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012) supported the validity of a three-factor model 
distinguishing between power, hedonism, and self-direction values at Time 1 (χ
2 
= 106.44, df 
= 51; RMSEA = 0.07; CFI = 0.87; SRMR = 0.06). This model fit the data significantly better 
than alternative models including a one-factor model (χ
2 
= 217.44, df = 54; RMSEA = 0.11; 
CFI = 0.63; SRMR = 0.09; Δχ
2 
(df = 3) =110.70, p < .001), and a two-factor model in which 
power and hedonism were specified to load onto one factor, and self-direction loaded onto a  
second factor (χ2 = 172.09, df = 53; RMSEA = 0.10; CFI = 0.73; SRMR = 0.07; Δχ2 (df = 2) 
=45.05, p < .001). We concluded that the three values should be treated as distinct variables.   
Interaction with study peers. Peer interaction was measured with an index consisting 
of four items used by Weidman (1979) and Lacy (1978) to measure the normative impact of 
study peers. We measured peer interaction using a combination of the following four items. 
The first item was: “Of all your close friends, what proportion are students in this 
school/Economics bachelor program?” Responses were provided on a four-point ordinal scale 
ranging from “none” (0) to “all” (4). A further two items asked participants how often they 
attended a house party and/or a birthday/name day celebration together with other students 
from their Bachelor program during the academic year. The final item assessed the number of 
hours per week that participants on average spent studying together with other students. 
Before computing an index each component variable was standardized. Items that measure 
the frequency of student formal and informal interaction with study peers have been 
demonstrated to have good predictive validity, meaningfully predicting student behaviors and 
attitudes during study (Lacy, 1978; Astin, 1993; Pascarella & Terenzini, 1980, 2005). Scale 
reliability for the four item measure of peer interaction was .66. 
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Controls. We controlled for other factors that have been highlighted as potential 
confounding variables in student value change by theoretical models of academic 
socialization (Weidman, 1989; Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005). We specifically controlled for 
relevant enrollment characteristics, i.e., class attendance, interaction with teachers, residence 
during study, and involvement in salaried work during study; and for relevant pre-enrollment 
characteristics, i.e., gender, age, ethnicity, parents’ occupational status, and family income. 
(a) Class attendance was measured as the degree of attendance of lectures and 
seminars on a 6-point scale ranging from “91-100%” (6), to “50% and less” (1). (b) 
Interaction with teachers was assessed using a formative indicator consisting of four items 
from Wilson et al.’s (1975) inventory that measured the number of times during the academic 
year that students met with their teachers to discuss class-related matters. (c) Following prior 
research on academic socialization (Vreeland & Bidwell, 1965; Lacy, 1978; Weidman, 1989; 
Tinto, 1987), we differentiate the impact of interaction with study peers from the impact of 
residence in dormitory. While the former entails interaction with students from the same 
academic discipline, the latter entails residence with students irrespective of their discipline. 
Residence during study was coded as 0 (resides independently of students) and 1 (resides 
with students). (d) Salaried work during study was measured as the number of hours per week 
that students were typically involved in doing salaried work during study. (e) Gender was 
coded as 1 (female) and 0 (male). (f) Age was measured on 5-point interval scale, anchored 
from “18 years of age and less” (1) to “22 years of age and more” (5). (g) Ethnicity was 
coded as 1 (Latvian) and 0 (other ethnic groups). (h) Parents’ occupational status was a 
combined measure of the father’s and mother’s occupation using a 10-point ordinal scale 
ranging from “manager: middle or higher level” (1) to “office worker: lower level” (5) to 
“pensioner” (10). (i) Family income per capita was assessed with a 35-point interval scale 
ranging from “up to 10 Latvian Lats” (1) to “351 Latvian Lats and more” (35).      




Following the established methodological practice in research on academic 
socialization we measured student value change using the longitudinal design of OLS 
regression with the “regressor variable method” (Astin, 1991; Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005). 
We regressed students’ Time 2 values on their Time 1 values and other pre-enrollment and 
enrollment characteristics in accordance with the model of academic socialization specified 
in Figure 1. The regressor variable method was chosen over the “change scores method” that 
uses value change scores as the criterion (Cronbach & Furby, 1970; Diggle, Heagertly, Liang 
& Zeger, 2013). Compared to the regressor variable method, the change scores approach 
tends to be less reliable (Kessler, 1977) and is more likely to be limited by regression towards 
the mean in the assessment of attribute change (Markus, 1980). The regressor variable 
method also enabled us to differentiate the effects of Time 1 values on Time 2 values from 
the effects of students’ pre-enrollment and enrollment characteristics (Astin, 1991). 
RESULTS 
Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics and correlations of study variables.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
We first established that economics students did in fact experience value change by 
conducting a set of ANCOVAs, comparing value change in students from the normatively 
homogenous SSER and the heterogeneous programs of the Latvian universities. The results 
showed that economics students at the SSER as well as students at the Latvian universities 
experienced an increase in the priority of power (F = 21.19, p < .001; and F = 49.97, p < .001, 
respectively) and hedonism (F = 44.82, p < .001; F = 59.30, p < .001), and a decrease in the 
priority of self-direction (F = 35.29, p < .001; F = 38.25, p < .001). The results also indicated 
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that economics students at the SSER experienced a stronger increase in power values than 
their counterparts from the Latvian universities (F = 7.11, p = .008). There were no 
differences in the extent of value change for hedonism (F = 0.16, p = .694) and self-direction 
(F = 0.72, p = .398) between economics students from the SSER and students from the 
normatively heterogeneous programs at the Latvian universities.    
OLS regression analyses supported this pattern of findings (effect a2 in Figure 1; see 
Table 2). Controlling for students’ pre-enrollment and enrollment characteristics, including 
Time 1 values, program normative homogeneity had a significant effect on power (β = .21, p 
= .047), but not on hedonism (β = .11, p = .32) and self-direction (β = .08, p = .52) at Time 2, 
suggesting a greater change of power values, but not of hedonism and self-direction, in the 
normatively homogeneous program.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Our hypotheses predicted that economics students in normatively homogenous 
programs are likely to experience a stronger increase in power values (Hypothesis 1) and 
hedonism values (Hypothesis 2) and a stronger decrease in self-direction values (Hypothesis 
3) than their counterparts from heterogeneous programs when they interact with their study 
peers. To test our hypotheses, we used moderated regression analyses, following the 
procedures recommended by Aiken and West (1991). We centered the predictor variables and 
multiplied them to create interaction terms. We then regressed the Time 2 values onto the 
control variables, the Time 1 values, and the interaction term, in accordance with the model 
of academic socialization (Figure 1: effects c, a2, b2, b3, e). The results of the OLS regression 
are presented in Table 2. There was a near-significant interaction between program normative 
homogeneity and peer interaction in predicting power at Time 2 (β = .13, p = .065), providing 
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some support for Hypothesis 1. Consistent with Hypotheses 2 and 3, there was a significant 
interaction between program normative homogeneity and peer interaction in predicting 
hedonism (β = .16, p = .037) and self-direction at Time 2 (β = –.24, p = .003).
3 
 
We conducted simple slope tests to explore in more detail whether the effects of peer 
interaction on value change would vary across normatively homogeneous versus 
heterogeneous programs. In line with our arguments, students at the SSER with high levels of 
peer interaction experienced a stronger change in values (power: b = .80, t = 2.13, p < .05; 
hedonism: b = .66, t = 2.28, p < .05; self-direction: b = -.63, t = -2.89, p < .01). For students 
at the normatively heterogeneous Latvian university business schools, peer interaction was 
not associated with value change (power: b = .21, t = 1.40, p = .16; hedonism: b = .66, t = 
2.28, p < .05; self-direction: b = -.05, t = -0.52, p = .61). This provides support for the idea 
that peer interaction plays a role in influencing value socialization in normatively 
homogeneous programs, but not in normatively heterogeneous programs.   
We further explored the possibility of student self-selection effects accounting for our 
findings in accordance with the model of academic socialization. First, we explored whether 
students’ pre-enrollment values shaped their self-selection into more or less homogeneous 
economics programs using a binary logistic regression (effect a1 in Figure 1; see Table 3). 
Controlling for students’ pre-enrollment characteristics, their initial values did not predict 
their enrollment in the SSER or Latvian universities (power: Wald statistic = 1.17, p = .28; 
hedonism: Wald statistic = 1.25, p = .26; self-direction: Wald statistic = 0.92, p = .34). Pre-
enrollment values thus did not explain students’ self-selection into the different programs.    
Second, we explored whether students’ interaction with peers was shaped by their 
pre-enrollment values. Using OLS regression, we regressed students’ interaction with peers 
on their values at the beginning of the study, controlling for their demographic characteristics 
and program normative homogeneity (effects b1 and d in Figure 1; see Table 4). The results 
VALUE CHANGE IN ECONOMICS EDUCATION  
24 
 
presented in Table 4 indicate that students’ values at the beginning of the economics program 
did not exert a significant effect on the likelihood of their interaction with study peers 
(power: β = .07; p = .27; hedonism: β =.10, p = .14; self-direction: β =.03, p = .71). Students’ 
pre-enrollment values were not related to how much they interacted with their peers. The 
results also indicate that program normative homogeneity exerted a significant effect on the 
likelihood of students’ interaction with peers (β = .23, p = .01), suggesting that economics 
students of SSER were more likely to interact with each other than their counterparts from 
Latvian universities.  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
DISCUSSION    
In line with previous research, we found evidence for value change in economics 
students over the course of their study. Our study was based on theoretical models of 
academic socialization and provided support for the effects of economics programs on values 
using a longitudinal design and controlling for pre-enrollment characteristics and 
theoretically important confounds.   
Our study advances research on the normative impact of economics education by 
highlighting the role of its normative homogenization. We investigated value change in 
students enrolled at a normatively homogenous economics program and at two normatively 
heterogeneous economics programs, and found some support for more pronounced value 
change in the normatively homogenous economics program.  
To gain insight into how value transmission may be influenced by the normative 
homogeneity of economics education, we examined peer interaction as a key mechanism of 
value socialization in more or less normatively homogeneous economics programs. Providing 
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initial support for this idea, we found that economics students in normatively homogeneous 
programs experience a stronger change in values than their counterparts from heterogeneous 
programs when they interact with their study peers. In normatively heterogeneous programs, 
interaction with study peers was not associated with value change. Below we consider the 
theoretical and practical implications of our findings. 
Theoretical implications 
We contribute to a limited, but growing, research stream on the impact of the 
homogenization of economics education on student normative socialization (Frank et al., 
1993; Frey & Meier, 2005). While management scholars have become increasingly 
concerned with the normative effects of the homogenization of economics education in 
business schools (Ghoshal, 2005; Giacalone & Thompson, 2006; Henisz, 2011), these effects 
have received little empirical attention. We advance understanding of these effects by 
highlighting interaction of study peers as a theoretically important, yet empirically under-
examined, mechanism (Newcomb, 1966; Weidman, 1989; Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005) 
through which normatively homogeneous economics programs are likely to shape student 
values. Our findings suggest that as economics students interact with each other during their 
studies, they internalize the self-interest oriented values of economics (Ghoshal, 2005; 
Ferraro et al., 2005), when these values are homogeneously endorsed in their program of 
studies.  
Consistent with the results of Frank, Gilovich and Regan’s (1993) study, power values 
increased more strongly in the normatively homogeneous economics program. We advance 
Frank et al.’s (1993) theoretical insights on the normative impact of homogeneous education 
by highlighting the unique influence of student interaction in the transmission of power 
values in homogeneous economics programs. In these programs students are less likely to be 
exposed to normative perspectives that contradict economics assumptions in their interactions 
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with study peers (Miller, 1999). In social interactions this creates the impression of consensus 
regarding the “typical” values endorsed by students’ peers (Wang et al., 2011). In addition, 
the values of homo economicus emphasize social comparison and self-enhancement, 
potentially further enhancing the impact of study peers on internalization of power values 
(Kasser et al., 2007; Srivastava et al., 2001). 
Although hedonistic maximization has been recognized as a core assumption of 
economics (Lewin, 1996; Drakopoulos, 1991; Weber, 1978), it has been little examined in 
prior research on the socialization of economics students (Gandal et al., 2005). Our findings 
suggest that in homogeneous economics programs students are inclined to internalize 
hedonism values when they interact with study peers. As students interact with each other in 
homogeneous economics programs, they may internalize economics values that emphasize 
the pursuit of hedonistic satisfaction by using various  ‘economic goods’, such as products, 
services and people (Drakopoulos, 1991). In these programs students may be normatively 
pressured to internalize hedonism values in their interactions to avoid normative sanctions for 
noncompliance with these values.   
Prior research has linked economics education with a lower concern with self-
direction (Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002). Our findings suggest that in homogeneous economics 
programs students are likely to experience a decrease in self-direction values when they 
interact with study peers. In these programs students may experience a strong normative 
pressure to act in an economically rational way by de-emphasizing the importance of their 
independence from external demands (Riesman et al., 1970; Weber, 1978). Moreover, the 
principles of economically rational action emphasize an extrinsically motivated involvement 
in activity as means to an end. Internalizing these principles may inhibit students’ self-
direction by undermining their intrinsically motivated involvement in activity as an end in 
and of itself (Kasser et al., 2007, Sheldon et al., 2004).  
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Practical implications  
Understanding the effects of economics education on value change is important, 
because, once internalized, values remain relatively stable and shape behaviors and attitudes 
across different vocational and social contexts (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). The 
influence of value change thus extends far beyond students’ time at business school and 
shapes their future choices and behaviors throughout their career. Since business school 
graduates tend to occupy strategic decision-making positions in organizations, their values 
also serve as normative standards for the formation and reproduction of prevailing economic 
and social institutions (Gandal et al., 2005).  
Management scholars increasingly recognize the unintended normative effects of the 
homogenization of business school education in accordance with economics values, and seek 
to understand ways to minimize these effects (Ghoshal, 2005; Giacalone & Thompson, 2006; 
Henisz, 2011; Moosmayer, 2012). Our findings provide some support for a more pronounced 
value change in normatively homogenous programs. They further highlight that in 
normatively homogeneous programs peer influence plays a critical role in the internalization 
of economics values. This has implications for business school leaders and policy makers that 
seek to prevent students’ internalization of economics values.  
Exposing students to a more diverse peer group may potentially prevent the 
transmission and socialization of economics values by minimizing the likelihood of a “false 
consensus” concerning the universal endorsement of these values among study peers. In the 
Latvian university business schools in our study economics students are exposed to a wider 
academic curriculum where, in addition to mainstream economics and business subjects, they 
are also expected to take classes in humanities and social sciences more generally (e.g. 
philosophy, history, political science, sociology, psychology etc.) which is likely to expose 
them to a more diverse peer group. In contrast, the organizational isolation of the SSER is 
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likely to restrict student interactions primarily to the undergraduate population of the 
economics program. 
Policy makers may be able to prevent the internalization of power values, by 
encouraging student interaction in academic programs that balance the study of econometric 
techniques with the study of the more generalized insights of classical political economy 
(Colander, 2001), institutional economics (Shiller, 2010; Henisz, 2011), business ethics 
(Evans et al., 2006; Giacalone, 2007; Rutherford et al., 2012), and other social sciences such 
as sociology or political science that place a stronger emphasis on the pursuit of pro-social 
goals (Giacalone & Thompson, 2006; Ghoshal, 2005). Our findings suggest that peer 
interaction in a more diversified academic program can prevent the internalization of power 
values by providing students with an opportunity to discuss, and reflect on, the underlying 
principles of economics and the intended and unintended consequences of their application in 
society.  
Policy makers may also prevent the internalization of economics values by facilitating 
student interaction in diversified academic programs with the generalized class administration 
layout. In the Latvian university business schools, classes are administered parallel to each 
other. During a four-month semester students take four to six classes. In the SSER classes are 
administered in a sequence of one after another. Students attend one class at a time for the 
duration of two to four weeks. The former class administration layout provides students with 
an opportunity to compare and integrate the content of diverse classes during their 
discussions with study peers. This is likely to prevent an unreflective internalization of 
economics values.   
Finally, policy makers in business schools may also reduce the impact of study peers 
on value change by recruiting members of teaching staff with a generalized training in social 
sciences (Moosmayer, 2012). Policy makers may recruit professors of economics who 
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investigate economic processes in conjunction with sociological, political, or psychological 
processes, or professors of management with an inter-disciplinary training in social sciences. 
Recruitment of teaching staff with the generalized academic training is likely to reduce 
socialization of economics values during students’ interactions by developing learning culture 
that encourages discussion of the role of values in social sciences. 
Limitations  
The longitudinal design of our study is a strength of the present paper and enables us 
to overcome a number of important limitations of previous research on the normative 
socialization of economics students. However, the study design also has a number of 
limitations.   
It is plausible that the differential effects of peer interaction in the economics 
programs of SSER and Latvian universities may be shaped by variations in student 
experiences other than program homogeneity (Astin, 1991). However, we control for 
students’ involvement in various academic and social experiences that have been highlighted 
as theoretically important confounds of student value change by models of academic 
socialization (Weidman, 1989; Tinto, 1987; Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005). For example, we 
differentiate the effects of peer interaction from other forms of students’ academic 
involvement, i.e., class attendance and interaction with teachers, and social involvement, such 
as residence with students irrespective of their academic discipline.  
Differential effects of peer interaction may be confounded with differences in 
students’ socio-economic status (Lueg & Lueg, 2014) and pre-enrollment values (e.g., 
Marwell & Ames, 1981; Yezer et al., 1996), as well as program tuition and admission 
policies (Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005). At the time when the survey was administered the 
tuition fee for SSER economics students was only 25 percent higher than for their 
counterparts in Latvian universities, so while the costs of attending the SSER were somewhat 
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greater, the difference in fees was not particularly drastic. Further, we controlled for the 
confounding effects of students’ family income, parents’ occupational status, belonging to a 
minority ethnic group, and involvement in paid work during study. In addition, our findings 
show that economics students’ pre-enrollment values were not related to their choice of 
program or to the extent of their interaction with study peers. There is thus some support for 
the idea that the differential effects of peer interaction are unlikely to be due to differences in 
student admission policies between the SSER and Latvian universities. 
Further, the normatively homogeneous and heterogeneous economics programs in our 
study may also have differed in other characteristics, such as their teaching methods. We 
sought to capture normative differences between the programs based on Colander’s (2001) 
classification of theoretically relevant program characteristics, such as, for example, 
emphasis on technical econometric methods, emphasis on saving and investment in 
foundational economics, and exposure of students to non-economics classes and students. 
Expert judges reliably distinguished between the programs based on these characteristics.    
Similarly, it is plausible that institutions which offer normatively homogeneous versus 
heterogeneous programs, respectively, may also differ in their goals and culture. However, 
the goals and culture of academic programs are shaped by their underlying values (Parsons & 
Platt, 1973; Smart, Feldman & Ethington, 2000; Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005). We 
differentiate the economics programs of the SSER and Latvian universities based on their 
homogenization in accordance with the values of homo economicus (Colander, 2001). We 
thus focus on the differences in the normative orientation of these institutions that are likely 
to account for other potential dissimilarities.     
The programs also differed in their language of instruction. There is some support for 
the idea that language of instruction matters to student behavior. Urbig et al. (2015) found 
that Dutch students who studied in a business school with English as a language of 
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instruction were more inclined to free-ride than their counterparts who studied in their native 
language. However, extensive cross-national research demonstrates that the reorganization of 
societies in accordance with the values of economics (i.e., economic rationalization) shapes 
the internalization of these values, irrespective of the linguistic, cultural, or ethnic 
characteristics of societies (Hofstede, 2001; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Kirkman, Lowe & 
Gibson, 2006). Moreover, economics students in Latvian universities mainly use coursework 
materials in English (e.g., textbooks, journal articles and case study readings) and are likely 
to learn concepts in the same language as students in SSER.  
In the present paper, we focused on three values which we argued are likely to be 
shaped by interactions of economics students. However, interactions of economics students 
may be also associated with the change of other values that are normatively opposed to the 
self-interest goals of homo economicus, such as, for example, pro-social values emphasizing 
public good and welfare (Marwell & Ames, 1981).  
A final limitation of our study is that we administered the survey in English as well as 
in Latvian, which constitutes a further potential confound. This concerns primarily our value 
measure as the other variables in our study are assessed via formative indicators which, due 
to their nature as composites, are unlikely to be affected by translation problems or cultural 
differences in responses (Graham & Mintu-Wimsat, 1997). We used a Latvian version of the 
Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) that was translated by Austers (2002) and has been shown to 
have adequate validity and reliability (Kalnina, 2004; Schwartz, 2006; Tart, 2011).  
Encouragingly, the internal consistencies of power, hedonism and self-direction value 
measures in Time 1 and 2 were very similar across the student populations of the SSER and 
the Latvian universities, which is consistent with the results of prior cross-cultural research 
that supports the equivalence of Schwartz’s value measures in different languages (Schwartz, 
1992; Spini, 2003; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004; Grouzet et al., 2005; Fontaine et al., 2008).  
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While the reliabilities of the three value scales were consistent across the two 
languages, they were relatively low. However, as noted by Schwartz (1992), these reliabilities 
can be considered acceptable because the scales are comparatively short. The reliabilities of 
the value measures in our study are in line with previous research which has reported similar 
scale reliabilities of Schwartz's value measures (Verplanken & Holland, 2002; Grouzet et al., 
2005; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005; Bain, Kashima & Haslam, 2006; Bardi et al., 2009).  
Future research directions 
 Future research may develop the insights of this study further by providing a more 
nuanced understanding of the effects of the normative homogenization of economics 
education on student value socialization. We argued that the economics program of SSER is 
more homogeneously guided by the values of homo economicus than the economics 
programs of Latvian university business schools (Giacalone & Thompson, 2006; Colander, 
2001). Drawing on theoretical models of academic socialization (Weidman, 1989; Pascarella 
& Terenzini, 2005) we expected, and found, that in the more normatively homogeneous 
program students’ values would be more strongly influenced by their peers. We suggested 
that this is because in homogeneous program students were less exposed to normative 
alternatives, resulting in a false consensus effect in their social interactions (Wang et al., 
2011). However, we did not directly measure the content of student interactions in terms of 
their involvement in the discussion of economics principles and assumptions. Future studies 
may fruitfully explore the content of student interactions using qualitative methods, or event-
contingent diary study methodologies in which students report on the content of interactions 
as they occur, thus preventing retrospective bias (Reis & Wheeler, 1991).  
Future research may advance understanding of peer influence in economics programs 
by examining the value orientations of the peers students interacted with, and by exploring 
students’ perceptions of their peers’ values. Social network analysis may be used to 
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investigate the normative effects of students’ involvement in networks with study peers that 
prioritize the pursuit of economics values or that enable students to fulfill economics values 
in their day to day activities.      
A more nuanced account of the normative effects of student interaction may be also 
developed by examining the moderating role of the homogenization of the peer group. For 
example, research could investigate how value change is affected by interactions with study 
peers who vary in the duration of their exposure to economics education. Future studies may 
also explore the normative effects of students’ interaction with study peers that are enrolled in 
normatively homogenous economics classes or ethics-related classes which counterbalance 
the normative effects of economics education. Research could more systematically 
investigate a wider range of program characteristics to more clearly establish the unique 
effects of the interaction between program normative homogeneity and peer influence. 
Research may also fruitfully assess the moderating effects of the cross-national 
variations in economic rationalization on the normative impact of peers in economics 
education. Future studies could examine if the impact of student interaction on value change 
is strengthened by the economic rationalization of societies. A more nuanced understanding 
of the normative impact of peers in economics education may be gained by examining the 
three-way interaction effects between the student interaction, program normative 
homogeneity and economic rationalization of societies.      
Conclusion   
In this study we have investigated value change in students from more or less 
normatively homogeneous economics programs and have illuminated the role of peer 
interaction in the socialization of economics values. By examining the value implications of 
interaction with study peers, we highlight an important mechanism of value socialization in 
economics education. The impact of student interaction on value change depends on the 
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extent to which business school education is homogenized in accordance economics values. 
Values of business school graduates not only shape their career choices, but also guide the 
development of strategic priorities in the private and public sector (Ghoshal, 2005). By 
highlighting peer interaction as an important mechanism of their socialization, this study 
enables business school leaders to better understand the consequences of program design for 
the values of economics graduates. This is important in order to improve the institutional 
standards of business practices. If economics not only predicts, but also shapes social 
phenomena in accordance with its values, then understanding how these values are socialized 
is critical for the informed, purposeful, and responsible selection and implementation of 
academic policies in business education. 
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 TABLE 1.  Means and Standard Deviations of Study Variables          
 All programs SSER University of Latvia Riga Technical University 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1. Sex 
a
 0.70 0.46 0.53 0.50 0.77 0.42 0.84 0.37 
2. Age 2.74 0.75 2.63 0.72 2.86 0.77 2.73 0.73 
3. Ethnicity 
b
 0.70 0.46 0.61 0.49 0.75 0.44 0.71 0.46 
4. Parents’ occupational status 
c
 4.01 1.91 3.66 1.73 4.02 2.00 4.55 1.93 
5. Family income 
d
   16.65 8.90   18.93     8.79   16.80 9.31   12.97 7.20 
6. Interaction with teachers 0.73 1.51 0.74     1.10 0.81 1.72 0.60 1.85 
7. Residence during study 
e
     1.20 0.35 0.81 0.89     1.38 1.14 1.52 1.04 
8. Class attendance 4.88 1.34 5.47 1.23 4.45 1.32     4.61 1.23 
9. Hours of paid work per week  9.12   12.73 3.29 5.54   13.36     15.47   11.57        12.81 
10. Program normative homogeneity 
f
     0.38 0.49 -  -  -  -  -  -  
11. Interaction with peers     -0.05 0.61 0.18 0.63    -0.23 0.54    -0.23 0.53 
12. Self-direction T1
 g
 4.80 0.76 4.82 0.76 4.77 0.80 4.81 0.69 
13. Self-direction T2
 g
 4.89 0.85 4.91 0.84 4.99 0.75 4.71 0.99 
14. Power T1
 g
     3.17 1.28 3.38 1.28 3.04 1.28 3.05 1.26 
15. Power T2
 g
     3.61 1.22 3.85 1.28     3.50 1.13 3.36 1.18 
16. Hedonism T1
 g
 4.51 1.14 4.45 1.19     4.59 1.06 4.50 1.18 
17. Hedonism T2
 g
  4.94 1.07 4.93 1.09 5.10 1.07 4.75 1.03 
N = 157-197 (due to missing values in demographic variables); 
a
 0 = Male, 1 = Female; 
b
 0 = Russian, 1 = Latvian; 
c 
higher score = higher 
occupational status; 
d 
higher score = higher income; 
e 
0 = separate from students, 1 = together with students; 
f
 0 = universities low in normative 
homogeneity; 1 = university high in normative homogeneity; g higher value score indicate greater importance.              
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 TABLE 2.  Correlations of Study Variables  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Sex 
a
         
2. Age -.02              
3. Ethnicity 
b
 -.04   .17*            
4. Parents’ occupational status 
c
 .06 -.07 -.02          
5. Family income 
d
     -.17* -.04 -.05   -.31***        
6. Interaction with teachers -.05 .00 -.05     -.03  .10      
7. Residence during study 
e
     .21*** .03   .15* .11    -.22*** .04    
8. Class attendance   .14* .03  -.15* .04 -.03 -.04     -.05  
9. Hours of paid work per week  -.03   .15* .11 -.08  -.15* .08   .16*     -.38*** 
10. Program normative homogeneity 
f
    -.28*** -.12 -.12  -.15*    .20** .01    -.28***      .35*** 
11. Interaction with peers   .00 -.07 -.05 -.12 .11 .02 -.05 -.03 
12. Self-direction T1
 g
 -.07 .01 -.04 -.08  .16* -.08 -.01 -.08 
13. Self-direction T2
 g
    -.20** .06 .00 -.08  .15* .03 -.11 -.11 
14. Power T1
 g
    -.22*** -.01 -.10 -.12   .19** .02 -.11 .06 
15. Power T2
 g
    -.24*** -.07 -.09 -.13   .24*** -.08   -.16* .02 
16. Hedonism T1
 g
 -.12 -.06 .12 -.04      .09  -.15* -.01  -.16* 
17. Hedonism T2
 g
 -.01 -.13 .14 -.05 .05    -.18** -.10 -.09 
N = 157-197 (due to missing values in demographic variables); *p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001; 
a
 0 = Male, 1 = Female; 
b
 0 = Russian, 1 = 
Latvian; 
c 
higher score = higher occupational status; 
d 
higher score = higher income; 
e 
0 = separate from students, 1 = together with students; 
f
 0 = 
universities low in normative homogeneity; 1 = university high in normative homogeneity; g higher value score indicate greater importance.       
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TABLE 2. Continued 
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Sex 
a
         
2. Age         
3. Ethnicity 
b
         
4. Parents’ occupational status 
c
         
5. Family income 
d
         
6. Interaction with teachers         
7. Residence during study 
e
         
8. Class attendance          
9. Hours of paid work per week          
10. Program normative homogeneity 
f
 -.36***               
11. Interaction with peers  -.01 .33***             
12. Self-direction T1
 g
 -.08 .16* .14*           
13. Self-direction T2
 g
 -.03 .17* .06 .54***         
14. Power T1
 g
  .04 .21*** .09 .02  .01       
15. Power T2
 g
  -.14* .26*** .13 .14 -.08 .54***     
16. Hedonism T1
 g
  .05 .03 .04 -.02 -.08 .29*** .24***   
17. Hedonism T2
 g
  .00 .08 .15* .03 -.01 .16* .27*** .59*** 
N = 157-197 (due to missing values in demographic variables); *p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001; 
a
 0 = Male, 1 = Female; 
b
 0 = Russian, 1 = 
Latvian; 
c 
higher score = higher occupational status; 
d 
higher score = higher income; 
e 
0 = separately from students, 1 = together with students; 
f
 0 
= universities low in normative homogeneity; 1 = university high in normative homogeneity; 
g
 higher value score indicate greater importance.    
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TABLE 2  Moderated Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Values at Time 2   
   Power Hedonism    Self-direction 
 Step 1   Step 2   Step 3 Step 1  Step 2   Step 3   Step 1  Step 2  Step 3 




  .53 (.08)
***
  -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Hedonism T1 -- -- --  .58 (.07)
*** 




 -- -- -- 







Sex -.04 (.22) -.03 (.23) -.03 (.23)  -.01 (.18)  .00 (.19)  .00 (.18) -.13 (.14) -.12 (.15)  - .12 (.14) 
Age  .03 (.11)  .06 (.11)  .06 (.11)   .00 (.09)  .02 (.09)  .02 (.09) -.02 (.07)  .00 (.07) -.01 (.07) 
Ethnicity  .04 (.18)  .03 (.19)  .03 (.18)   .17 (.14)
*
  .15 (.15)’  .14 (.15)  .03 (.11)  .02 (.12)  .03 (.11) 
Parents’ occupational status     -.10 (.04) -.10 (.04) -.11 (.04)   .01 (.03)  .01 (.04)  .00 (.04)  .07 (.03)  .07 (.03)  .08 (.03) 
Family income   .03 (.01)  .03 (.01) -.01 (.01)  -.11 (.01) -.11 (.01) -.15 (.01)’  .13 (.01)  .13 (.01)  .18 (.01)
*
 
Program normative homogeneity  .23 (.20)
**
  .21 (.24)
*
  .22 (.24)
*
 .09 (.16)  .11 (.19)  .13 (.19)  .04 (.13)  .08 (.15)  .04 (.15) 
Interaction with peers   .09 (.15)  .10 (.15)   .07 (.12)  .08 (.12)  -.03 (.10) -.04 (.09) 
Interaction with teachers  -.03 (.21) -.03 (.21)  -.03 (.17) -.03 (.16)   .02 (.13)  .02 (.13) 
Residence during study   -.04 (.09) -.05 (.09)  -.01 (.07) -.02 (.07)   .02 (.06)  .04 (.06) 
Class attendance  -.09 (.08) -.09 (.08)  -.07 (.07) -.07 (.06)  -.08 (.05) -.08 (.05) 
Hours of paid work   -.10 (.01) -.11 (.01)  -.02 (.01) -.03 (.01)  -.02 (.01)  .00 (.01) 
Program normative homogeneity 
x Interaction with peers 
   .13(.32)’      .16(.25)
*





 .45 .47 .49 .39 .40 .42 .29 .29 .35 
F  13.65
***
   8.34
***




   6.27
***
    6.31
***
   6.73
***
   3.88
***





 .42 .41 .43 .35 .34 .36 .24 .22 .27 
N = 157 (due to missing values in demographic variables); ’ p < .07, *p <.05, **p <.01, ***p <.001; Standardized regression coefficients 
(standard errors in parentheses). 
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TABLE 3         Binary Logistic Regression Analyses Predicting Program Normative 
Homogeneity (Enrollment in SSER vs. in University Business Schools)        
 
Wald statistic 
(S.E. in parentheses) 
Power T1 1.17 (.19) 
Hedonism T1 1.25 (.22) 
Self-direction T1 0.92 (.32) 
Sex         16.53 (.48)
***
 
Age 2.34 (.28) 
Ethnicity 2.45 (.46) 
Parents’ occupational  status   3.16 (.12) 
Family income  2.67 (.03) 
Cox & Snell R
2 
               .27 
Nagelkerke R
2
               .37 
N = 157 (due to missing values in demographic variables); ’ p < .07, *p <.05, **p <.01., ***p 
<.001.                
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(β, SE in parentheses) 
   Step 1      Step 2 
Power T1  .10 (.04)   .07 (.04) 
Hedonism T1  .10 (.04)   .10 (.04) 
Self-direction T1  .05 (.06)   .03 (.06) 
Sex  .09 (.09)   .13 (.10) 
Age -.13 (.05)  -.11 (.05) 
Ethnicity -.01 (.09)   .01 (.09) 
Parents’ occupational  status   -.14 (.02)  -.11 (.02) 
Family income  -.01 (.00)  -.03 (.00) 
Program normative homogeneity (SSER vs. 
university business school)  
 




2   
             .07         .10 





             .02         .06 
N = 157 (due to missing values in demographic variables); ’ p < .07, *p <.05, **p <.01., ***p 
<.001.             
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ENDNOTES     
1
 Frank et al. (1993) measured students’ self-interest using the responses to two 
scenarios of an "honesty survey". In the first scenario, "the owner of a small business is 
shipped ten microcomputers but is billed for one". Students were asked to indicate "whether 
the owner will inform the computer company of the error". In addition to estimating the 
likelihood that the mistake would be pointed out by the owner, students were also asked to 
indicate their own preferred mode of conduct if they were the owner of the company. In the 
second scenario, students were asked to indicate whether "a lost envelope containing $100 
and bearing the owners name on it is likely to be returned by the person who finds it" (p.168). 
Students were asked to estimate the likelihood that the envelope would be returned if they 
themselves had lost it, and whether they themselves would return it.     
2
 John Stuart Mill used Bentham’s hedonistic maximization doctrine in his 
conceptualization of the values of homo economicus (Drakopoulos, 1991). Early marginalist 
economists subsequently incorporated the principles of hedonistic maximization in their 
marginal utility theory. Jevons (1871: 44), for example, recognized that “pleasure and pain 
are undoubtedly the ultimate objects of the calculus of Economy”. With the formalization of 
economic theory in the twentieth century the focus on hedonistic maximization was gradually 
replaced with the allegedly more value-neutral concepts of utility or satisfaction, yet the 
concern with maximization of pleasure remained the core motive underlying economically 
rational action (Becker, 1976; Lewin, 1996).    
3
 A longitudinal regression design with the value change scores as the criterion 
yielded similar results. Controlling for students’ pre-enrollment and enrollment 
characteristics, the interaction effects of program normative homogeneity and peer interaction 
were significant for the measures of the change in power (β = .25, p < .05), hedonism (β = 
.31, p < .01), and self-direction (β = –.27, p < .01).     
